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Presidency First: The Unitary Executive Governs America
Abstract
While considerable debate has occurred over the founders’ original conception of
the executive’s proper role, most can agree that the unitary executive theory
developed during the George W. Bush administration expanded executive power
far beyond that original conception. Though a vocal opponent to Bush’s
expansion of power, President Barack Obama asserted similarly sweeping powers
in both foreign and domestic policy. While President Donald Trump demonstrates
clear ambivalence towards an all-encompassing rule of law, early indicators
suggest that he will exhibit a proclivity for robust assertions of executive power
that will rival or surpass his immediate predecessors even if, in some cases, he
would prefer to punt politically challenging issues to Congress under the guise of
not having the power to act. For its part, Congress has largely appeared
unwilling or unable – functional equivalents – of restraining expansions of
executive power by any of the three most recent presidents. As such, the unitary
executive is alive and well … and, even if it is not actively expanding under
Trump, previous expansions under his predecessors mean there is plenty of
executive authority to go around.
On February 6, 2017, John Yoo published an op-ed in The New York Times entitled
“Executive Power Run Amok” in which he castigated new President Donald Trump for an apparent
lack of knowledge of how executive power works as well as a perceived extraconstitutional mandate
to ameliorate what Trump called “American carnage” in his inaugural address. This was ironic given
that it was Yoo who was the architect of arguably the most dramatic expansion of executive power in
American history when he conceived – and codified through Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos
binding on the executive branch – a virtually unchecked level of authority for President Bush to
conduct the “War on Terror.” Executive power has long been at the forefront of the American
political conversation, and, in recent years, has seen a huge expansion as America has shifted from an
age of congressional government to a new era of presidential government defined by an
administrative presidency that governs through executive action. In many respects, Congress has
acquiesced – and, in some cases, directly aided – to this expansion in executive power. Both
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Presidents Bush and Obama zealously guarded and asserted the authority of the executive to
implement consequential policies both in the domestic and foreign realms and exerted singular
control over the executive branch as a unitary element. Although President Trump has, at times,
struggled to manage the executive branch and has punted key policy decisions to Congress, the
opening of his presidency suggests that he has no qualms about asserting unilateral, massive claims
of executive power when it is convenient, which likely portends the continued expansion of
executive power as robust congressional oversight seems to be an increasingly anachronistic concept.
As they gathered to draft the Constitution in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787, the
framers ultimately aimed to strike a balance between the tyrannical executive from whom they had
declared independence just over a decade prior and the Articles of Confederation, which essentially
established 13 loosely-aligned sovereign states that were thoroughly inept to govern as a cohesive
country. After the Constitutional Convention spent the summer drafting Article I, it fell to Alexander
Hamilton – an early proponent of a powerful, singular executive – to draft Article II along with a
small committee (Warshaw 2005, 1-2). Hamilton subsequently wrote “Federalist No. 70,” which
argued that only a unitary executive with power over the entire executive branch could effectively
execute the duties of the president; the executive must have “energy” and discharge its duties with
“[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and despatch [sic],” (Hamilton 1788b). Hamilton’s writings inspired
constitutional scholars of the late 20th and early 21st centuries to develop the theory of a robust
unitary executive whose “executive power” – vested in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution – is
virtually unchecked, particularly in foreign policy (Divoll 2013, 152; Crouch, Rozell, and
Sollenberger 2017, 564). While the original unitary executive theory – as developed during the
Reagan administration – generally suggests that all executive power is vested in the president, who
wields total control of the executive branch, under the George W. Bush administration, OLC lawyers
such as John Yoo developed a novel concept that the president’s authority as “commander-in-chief”
and his oath to “preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution of the United States implies that
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neither the courts nor Congress can question any action the president says are fulfilling those
responsibilities (Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger 2017, 564-66; Savage 2007, 123; J. Yoo 2009; J.
Yoo 2017). Both at home and abroad, Bush had “a propensity, and a capacity, to go it alone,”
(Howell 2005, 418-19).
Historical scholarship such as the magnum opus of Richard Neustadt (1991) suggests that the
president inhabits an inherently weak office that draws its only power from a capacity to persuade.
While the public expects presidents to “accomplish far more than their formal powers alone permit,”
presidents can only accomplish those objectives through persuasion (Kleinerman 2009, 89, 116).
William Howell, however, wrote a book entitled Power Without Persuasion that argues that
persuasion is not a necessary component to wield massive executive power. In a subsequent article
(2005), Howell wrote,
The image of presidents striking out on their own to conduct a war on terrorism or
reconstruct civil rights policies or reconstruct the federal bureaucracy contrasts sharply with
scholarly literatures that equate executive power with persuasion and, consequently place
presidents at the fringes of the lawmaking process. (421)
Further, with perpetual gridlock seemingly endemic in Congress over the last few decades as well as
the time legislators have to spend on legislating (as the time they spend fundraising, for example,
continues to grow) constantly diminishing, presidents have all the more opportunity to take unilateral
action (Howell 2005, 425, 436).
No modern president seized these opportunities with more unapologetic fervor than George
W. Bush. Even before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Bush had ordered a massive audit
of regulations within federal departments and pioneered the White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives, an integral component of his “compassionate conservatism” agenda (Howell
2005, 434-35; Warshaw 2009, 88-91). This development came under the auspices of the president’s
power to supervise the executive branch and “take care” that the laws be faithfully executed; ample
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regulatory space was created by previous legislative ambiguity, and the president seized the
opportunity to act, picking up the mantle of Bill Clinton, who had “perfected the art of go-alone
governing,” (Howell 2005, 417; Article II, Section 3; Kiefer 1998; Warshaw 2004).
However, Bush’s greatest expansion of the powers of the unitary executive came in the realm
of foreign policy after 9/11 (J. Yoo 2009; Yoo, Calabresi, and Colangelo 2005, 722-29; Perine 2006).
From holding detainees as “enemy combatants” with no legal rights in an extraterritorial prison camp
subject to trial only by military tribunal to a massive new spying program, Bush robustly asserted
executive power as commander-in-chief to do what he saw as necessary to protect the American
people (Perine 2006; Howell 2005, 418). In fact, John Yoo argued that no other branch had the
authority to review the president’s decisions; in a speech, he said, “Congress cannot use …
legislative powers to change the Constitution’s allocation of powers between the president and
Congress in the war power,” (Perine 2006). This notion – which underlay some of Bush’s most
aggressive expansions of power – has vast consequences … and, with some, notable exceptions,
namely Senator John McCain, who famously declared torture to be out of bounds no matter how
heinous the crimes of the alleged offenders nor how absolute the president’s supposed authority by
saying, “It’s not about who they are; it’s about who we are,” Congress largely acquiesced,
particularly when it was under Republican control (Cole 2005; Perine 2006). Accordingly, the Bush
administration, fueled by trailblazing lawyers and hawkish neoconservatives (e.g., Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney), waged a multi-theater war on terror
that involved the unprecedented extension of powers of the unitary executive (Warshaw 2009).
On the domestic side, the unitary executive theory was applied in full force as well. Although
congressional committee investigations have long been acknowledged as crucial tools to expose
“dark places in government” – a characterization that dates at least to the Brownlow Commission’s
landmark 1937 report advocating significant expansion in presidential staff – Bush’s unitary
executive waged a coordinated campaign to limit cooperation with investigations that might be
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harmful politically or otherwise to the administration (Kitrosser 2015, 171). The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) habitually reviewed (and revised, or even rewrote) congressional
testimony and upcoming government reports, political staff suppressed agency rulemaking
particularly on environmental matters, and, in some cases, political staff also suppressed – or altered
– the results of scientific studies (Kitrosser 2015, 181, 185-86; Warshaw 2009, 106). Furthermore,
Cheney coordinated a pro-business presidency through the White House (and specifically through a
newly integrated Executive Office of the President that eliminated the separate Office of the Vice
President, whose deliberations may not have been protected by executive privilege) (Warshaw 2009,
104-08). By using the White House’s Council on Environmental Quality, for example, to spearhead
environmental policy rather than the Environmental Protection Agency, internal deliberations were
shielded from congressional inquiry, something the White House went to court several times to
defend, and policies reflecting the goals of the executive were implemented largely away from public
view (Warshaw 2009, 109-14). As Howell noted in 2005, “Bush has not stood idly by while
committee chairs debated whether to introduce legislation on his behalf. Instead … he has seized the
initiative, he has acted boldly (some would say irresponsibly, or even unconstitutionally), and then he
has dared his political adversaries to counter,” (421).
The other notable realm in which Bush asserted sweeping executive authority is in his
penchant for issuing signing statements to define his interpretation of statutes he was signing into
law. These almost unreviewable (establishing standing is extremely difficult) statements served, in
some cases, as a de facto line item veto (something the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in
Clinton v. City of New York (1998)), and, in others, allowed the president to veto almost the entirety
of a statute by stating he would interpret it “consistent with” his authority as commander-in-chief, a
favorite phrase of Bush signing statements (May 1998, 72, 95; Savage 2007a). Decades earlier,
Cheney had decried the erosion of presidential power in the “Minority Report” on Reagan’s actions
in the Iran-Contra Affair; he later penned a separate memo that stated the president has “inherent”
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power to exercise Constitutional prerogatives, and it is left to the president’s judgment what those
prerogatives are (Cheney 1989, 32).

The administration’s extensive use of signing statements

became a flashpoint in the subsequent presidential campaign, and it led many to decry the return of
the “imperial presidency,” which Charlie Savage included in the title of his 2007 book, an allusion to
Arthur Schlesinger’s 1973 classic by the same name (2007a; 2007b). Just as Bush did not create the
unitary executive theory (at least insofar as the president has sole power to supervise the entirety of
the executive branch), Bush did not create the concept of signing statements – their use had been on
the rise over the administrations immediately before him – but he harnessed their use to revolutionize
their power to alter administrative interpretation of statutes and to subvert Congress’s intentions
(May 1998, 72-77; Savage 2007b).
When Barack Obama took office, he promised a different approach to executive power that
respected the intentions of Congress and was more accountable to the American people (Savage
2007b). A constitutional law professor, Obama explicitly rejected many of Bush’s assertions of
executive power and seemed to dismiss the unchecked unitary executive theory as the work of
overzealous constitutional neophytes. Nevertheless, he ultimately embraced some of its core tenets
including the warrantless surveillance program exposed by Edward Snowden as well as extrajudicial
killings of American citizens when he ordered the drone strike that killed suspected terrorist Anwar
al-Awlaki in 2011 after administration lawyers determined he had requisite executive authority to do
so (Savage 2007a; Miller 2014).
Obama was similarly aggressive in taking executive action domestically. After Democrats
lost control of Congress in 2010, White House Senior Counselor John Podesta presented Obama with
47 potential initiatives that could commence from the Oval Office without Congress (Gitterman
2017, 40). The next year, Obama unveiled his “We Can’t Wait” initiative, under which he took
several executive actions without Congress including raising the minimum wage for home-care
workers, instituting tax credits for disabled veterans, and expediting renewable energy projects
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(White House 2011; White House 2012; Flavin 2011). Obama’s penchant for “legislating from the
Oval Office” was frequently derided particularly by Republicans in Congress, namely Ted Cruz, but,
even with firm majorities in the later years of the Obama presidency, Republicans seldom mustered
the ability to stop Obama from implementing sweeping new federal programs such as Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which Obama signed after Congress failed to pass the
DREAM Act (Cruz 2014; Alcindor and Stolberg 2017). Later in his presidency, Obama used his
executive authority to enter executive agreements with Iran and the P5+1 powers to curb the
development of the Iranian nuclear program as well as to negotiate the Trans Pacific Partnership and
the Paris Climate Accords (from both of which Trump would later withdraw, exercising executive
authority of his own as the nation’s “sole organ” in foreign policy, a power codified in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp (1936)).
With respect to signing statements, Obama committed, upon taking office, to issue them only
under specific circumstances, not to subvert congressional intentions, and never for political reasons,
a direct rebuke to Bush, but, nevertheless, he issued a panoply of official signing statements (and, as
his presidency progressed, more opaque statements of administrative policy and OLC opinions) in
many of the same ways as those which, under the Bush administration, drew Obama’s harsh
criticism (Kelley 2012, 1135; Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger 2013, 888-89). Overall, despite
public promises to roll back the imperial presidency of Bush, Obama not only continued its policies
during his two terms in office, he has expanded its utility into the domestic arena in ways that were
previously unimagined. His presidency could rightfully be characterized not only as the “imperial
presidency, part three,” but also as the “legislating presidency,” as he seized the lawmaking mantle
that Congress abdicated.
Donald Trump took office determined to “drain the swamp” of Washington insiders and
establish a presidency based on “winning” for the “forgotten men and women” of America (Trump
2017c). One unquestioned power of the president is the power to make appointments in the executive
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branch. However, particularly in the State Department, the Trump administration has done so at an
historically slow pace, which is ostensibly impeding his goal to dismantle the Washington
bureaucracy. In recent weeks, Trump has suggested that he may leave many positions unfilled, which
is of questionable constitutionality; courts have ruled that when Congress creates an office, the
president is obliged to fill it as part of his duty to “take care” that the laws be faithfully executed
(Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci 1973; Fisher 1997, 27-28; Fonzone and Geltzer 2017). This
may well become a subject of litigation if he indicates that some key positions will be permanently
unfilled. Nevertheless, despite his slow pace in assembling a team to help him execute his duties,
Trump has taken some major executive action.
Although his first ten months in office provide a limited sample size, already, examples
abound that demonstrate Trump’s willingness to robustly assert his own unilateral authority as
commander-in-chief to implement his agenda in both foreign and domestic realms. Emboldened by
populist advisors Steve Bannon and Stephen Miller, Trump issued a sweeping travel ban just seven
days after he took office that barred foreign nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries from
entering the United States (2017d; Warshaw 2017). Outside advisor Rudy Giuliani later told FOX
News that Trump had asked how to do a “Muslim ban” legally, and this executive order is what a
team of Republican lawyers developed (Wang 2017). After a federal court struck down the ban,
Trump tweeted on February 4, “The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes lawenforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” It was this series of events
that prompted John Yoo to castigate the Trump administration in a New York Times op-ed that called
the policy “ill-conceived” and to suggest Trump’s lack of governmental knowledge would
undermine his presidency (J. Yoo 2017). However, echoes of Yoo’s theory that the president’s power
to protect America as commander-in-chief cannot be reviewed by other branches of government are
apparent in Trump’s tweets, even if they are less eloquently articulated. After all, the name of the
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executive order was a direct reference to that power: “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States.”
While Trump’s apparent undermining of civil institutions earned him rebukes from both
sides of the aisle (including then-Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch), he has largely continued to
harshly criticize figures within the justice system whom he deems adversarial to his agenda. In fact,
he fired Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, which raised questions
as to whether the decision was influenced by a potential Bharara investigation that would touch the
president or his family (M. Green 2017). Previously, he fired Acting Attorney General Sally Yates
ostensibly for refusing to defend his travel ban, although he later called her “weak” on immigration,
raising further questions as to his underlying motivations (J. Yoo 2017).
C. Yoo, Calabresi, and Colangelo (2005) frame their examination of the unitary executive’s
history around three devices: the president’s power to remove subordinate executive branch officials,
the president’s power to direct their exercise of discretionary executive power, and the president’s
power to veto or nullify subordinates’ exercise of such power (607). As noted, Trump certainly has
demonstrated a capacity to fire officials who refuse to enact his agenda, but his record in directing
their utilization of discretionary executive power has been less consistent. Trump has repeatedly
lambasted Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ decision to recuse himself from the Russia investigation,
which ultimately led to the appointment of Robert Mueller as a special counsel (Baker, Schmidt, and
Haberman 2017). Ostensibly, Trump has no direct authority to fire Mueller – he would have to first
go through Sessions and his deputy, Rod Rosenstein, which would trigger a Nixon-esque “Saturday
Night Massacre” situation; accordingly, the unitary executive theory appears not yet to have reached
its outer limit, which would seemingly allow for a scenario in which Trump fires Mueller directly
(Rudalevige 2006; Schlesinger 1973; Columbus 2017). Although Attorney General John Ashcroft
appointed a special counsel during the Bush administration to investigate Karl Rove and Scooter
Libby, the circumstances were different since Bush would never come under investigation and he
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had no (extrinsic) hostility towards it (Calabresi and Yoo 2008, 410). One example where Trump has
had success in directing subordinates to implement his agenda is at the EPA, which has moved
quickly to dismantle Obama’s legacy of executive action on climate change and renewable energy
issues by implementing policies friendly to key industries allied with Trump, namely coal
(Davenport and Lipton 2017; Lipton and Friedman 2017). Using Yoo’s, Calabresi’s, and Colangelo’s
framework, Trump has had mixed success in enhancing the power of the unitary executive.
Overall, Trump’s early executive orders largely seem to be aimed as reflexive rollbacks of
Obama policies (White 2017, 15). Interestingly, after Stephen Miller observed that Trump’s
menagerie of early executive orders constituted him “doing more” in the first three weeks of his
presidency than most presidents ever accomplish, Hoover Institution Research Fellow Adam White
cautioned,
If the president and his supporters are seduced by the seemingly friction-free ease of signing
executive orders, they may become less interested in doing the hard, slow work of engaging
the legislative process. That was ultimately the story of the Obama administration; it might
become the story of the Trump administration. (21)
Notably, Trump has punted several key (and thorny) political issues to Congress rather than
continue executive programs of the past by announcing the end of DACA as well as the cessation of
cost-sharing reduction payments under the Affordable Care Act. While Zachary Karabell wrote in
Politico (2017) that Trump is “throwing away” creative extensions of executive power conceived
under prior administrations, which forces Congress to act in realms where it should have acted all
along, an equally likely scenario seems to be that Trump, whose presidency is predicated on taking
credit for positive things (e.g., the stock market, battlefield gains against ISIS, etc.) and avoiding
blame for negative things (e.g., the collapse of healthcare legislation, the potential for the deportation
of DREAMers), is simply setting himself up to avoid blame should the congressional action for
which he hopes go awry. After the collapse of the Senate healthcare plan, Trump was quick to blame
Senate Republicans rather than accept responsibility, but after the House passed a plan, he convened
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a celebration in the Rose Garden to take credit, which is emblematic of his early approach to
governing. For his part, Karabell wrote, “It is not entirely clear whether Trump … fully grasps that he
is devolving presidential powers rather than seizing them. But it is happening nonetheless,” (2017).
Howell would probably counter, however, that presidents have historically taken more significant
executive action in periods of congressional gridlock (which would certainly characterize the end of
the Obama administration) and less when the majority party is larger and more unified (which would
ostensibly characterize the present scenario), and, as such, Congress should have the capacity to
address healthcare and immigration without substantive executive action (Howell 2005, 430).
For its part, the GOP-controlled Congress has not conducted much robust oversight of the
administration. Though several congressional committees are investigating Russia’s involvement in
the 2016 election, no serious oversight of the Trump administration’s day-to-day affairs has yet
materialized leaving Trump relative free rein to implement executive action as he sees fit, a similar
prerogative to what Bush enjoyed (Perine 2006). That said, Republican Senator Bob Corker
convened a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the president’s unilateral authority
to launch nuclear weapons (Wilkie 2017). While the hearing may not have yielded new legislation, it
does represent a tacit rebuke to Trump’s bombast towards North Korea and Iran from within his own
party, which may portend more robust oversight in the future should Trump’s inner-party alienation
continue. Already, a few other Republican senators – most notably John McCain – have indicated
serious concern with Trump’s temperament and agenda, so future oversight may not be entirely off
the table (Phillips 2017). Certainly, a potentially Democrat-controlled Congress after the 2018
midterm elections would likely subject Trump to much more aggressive legislative oversight. In that
scenario, the Trump administration would undoubtedly redouble its efforts to design executive action
to further its policy goals like it has done at the EPA thus far and like Obama did in the latter part of
his term. Further, he may begin to make more frequent use of signing statements, which, to date, he
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has done only on a few occasions (most notably in asserting that Congress went too far in restricting
executive power on the Russia sanctions bill) (Savage 2017b).
America today is in an era of presidential government where the White House makes policy
through executive orders and presidential memoranda. This era has spanned presidential
administrations of both parties, and while the outer contours of executive power have ebbed and
flowed, nothing in the first ten months of the Trump administration indicates a substantive departure
from the status quo, which is that the unitary executive is gradually expanding to compensate for the
ever-decreasing capacity of Congress to enact policy through traditional legislation. While Trump
may not make forays into new arenas of executive power, the dramatic expansion of the imperial
presidency during the beginning of the 21st century has left him with plenty of authority to enact his
agenda. More than two centuries ago, the Founding Fathers fled the tyranny of a unilateral executive
in Great Britain and devised a system of checks and balances to avoid a repeat in the new United
States. These checks and balances have largely eroded as the executive branch has grown stronger in
what is generally a zero-sum game with the legislative branch. Only time will tell what the future of
the American Presidency holds, but one truth surely endures: a power vacuum always fills itself, and,
unless Congress reasserts its lawmaking prerogatives, it may well fade into feckless obscurity, which
only enhances a plenary executive authority. Whether Donald Trump can capitalize on that
opportunity to make his presidency as consequential as that of his two immediate predecessors
remains unclear, but what is abundantly clear is that Trump’s early actions as president demonstrate
that he embodies what Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger (2017) call the “unitary executive mindset”
and, likely, Trump will seek only to extend his power whenever it is convenient to do so (570). In
effect, the Donald Trump will put the “presidency first.”
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